as to the circumstances of his having fallen so low, he told me the following. The Emir was once playing chess in his presence with one of his begs, and at a critical point, after long reflection, he made a decisive move and then turned, self-satisfied to the favorite to ask if he thought the play a good one. The latter answered truthfully that he could consider the move only as an unlucky one, and the result immediately showed that he had not been deceived, for the Emir lost the game after only two more moves. The Emir was so exasperated by the frankness of his chess adviser as well as at the loss of the game that he dismissed the man then and there, and confiscated all his property. Since naturally all the others turned their backs on the Emir's abandoned favorite, whose favor they had courted until that time, there was nothing left for the unlucky chess master but to beg for his bread. 643 558

The willfulness with which the Central Asian khans have always treated all their subjects, without regard to person, is only somewhat mitigated by their constant fear of revolts and assassination. The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, was driven from the land by his subjects three times. The grandfather of the present Emir of Bukhara, Nasr Allah, who was finally also done away with by his favorite wife, lived in constant fear of death after he himself had murdered all his brothers, and he had recourse to extensive precautionary measures to ensure himself against poisoners. His drinking water had to be brought directly from the Zerafshan and inspected and sealed by two court officials and each time it had to be tasted first by the Kushbegi and his servants before the Emir himself decided to drink it. The food intended for the Emir was prepared not in his own harem but in the harem of these same officials and under their inspection. Of the finished dishes the Kushbegi and his followers always ate first, and only if there were no signs of poisoning among them after the passage of an hour, the food would be sent over to the Emir in a closed, sealed chest. The same procedure was followed with the fruit brought to the table of the Emir. Nasr Allah trusted his own sons so little that he always forced them to leave the capital whenever he changed his residence to Samarkand for the summer, so that they might not bring about some sort of revolt in his absence. 643 [669]

/177/ As for political organization in the Central Asian khanates, it is distinguished by extensive decentralization. Government officials, whose sphere of activity extends over the entire state, on the whole do not exist. The khan rules directly only that town in which he resides; here he collects taxes, appoints the administrative officials 631

631 and the judges, and personally arbitrates the more important issues of dispute or crime. The administration of the towns belonging to the khanate is assigned by the khan to governors who bear the title of beg and who administer their district almost independently. the begs name the officials and judges in their regions according to their own good judgment, usually from among their relatives; they gather the taxes, and are only obliged to pay the khan a specified sum every year for their region; and in case of war to produce an army from their region those men capable of bearing arms. Thus in actuality, the khanate consists, of a loose conglomeration of small states, all of which are made up of a larger town and the surrounding villages.

This arrangement has its basis in the local conditions. In Turkestan the individual states do not consist of a cohesive area but of isolated oases, scattered often hundreds of kilometers apart over the endless sandy deserts and hunger steppes. As a result of the great distances, the difficulty of communication and the general insecurity in these sparsely populated regions, it is impossible to keep these faraway oases completely under control by one center. For this reason, it was necessary to arm the governors with great powers of authority for all eventualities, and to transfer to them all responsibility for their oases.

The position of the begs in the Central Asian khanates was formerly quite similar to that of the satraps in the ancient kingdom of Persia. Like the satraps, the begs frequently revolted against their lords, often successfully, and they carried on wars with their neighboring begs without paying any attention to their khan. Only very recently, as a result of Russian influence in the khanates which still survive, the power of the khan over his begs has increased so much that they have to a great extent lost their former independence and sunk to the level of mere officials. The example of the two towns of Shaar and Kitab has contributed especially to the accomplishment of this change in the relation of the beg to the khans. The begs of these towns had also for years revolted together against the Emir of Bukhara and maintained their independence against all attacks on the part of the Emir, but they were conquered at last by the Russians on behalf of the Emir, and taken prisoner and interned within Russian territory, and since then no beg thinks of revolting against his lord.

103 /178/ Because of the circumstances mentioned above, there are also no distinctive names of countries in Turkestan, and each state takes its name from the most important oasis of those belonging to one political unit. Thus Kokand was that state of which the oasis

2: Caroe 5-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

sion of the facts. But from the beginning its existence made nonsense of the high-sounding phrases of the 1917 Declaration, and ensured for Russians a dominating position in Turkistan not as sojourners like the English in India, but as permanent settlers with the main stakes in their hand. In parts of Turkistan we shall even see that with the years the Russians ousted the native population and attained an actual numerical preponderance.

THE FIVE REPUBLICS

With this clue in hand it is time to take up the tale from the point when the Soviets, having destroyed the national governments of Kokand, Alash Orda and Bashkiria, and having come to grips with the Basmachis, were free to devote serious attention to the execution of a firm colonial policy. The picture will be clearer if we pass in quick review the measures which resulted in the eventual setting up of the five Soviet republics in the Central Asia of today.

The Kremlin inherited from Tsardom in Central Asia four units—(i) the Stepnoi Krai or Steppe Territory, roughly coincident with the northern steppe (northern Kazakistan of today); (ii) the Turkistan province with the Farghana Valley, Tashkent and Samarkand, covering most of Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe; (iii) and (iv) the quasi-independent States of Bukhara and Khiva. (i) and (ii) had been directly administered under the Tsars, (iii) and (iv), as we know, were left in internal matters to their own Khans and during the interregnum had been the chief seat of the Basmachi troubles. As soon as the able Red General, Frunze, was in a position to report that conquest was secure and resistance only sporadic, Stalin announced[1] a territorial division which did not at first break entirely new ground.

The directly administered Tsarist provinces of the Steppe Territory and Turkistan had already been included in the

[1] Stalin, speaking on 26th Dec. 1922 to All-Russian Congress of Soviets. See *op. cit.* pp. 22[illegible].

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

642 631 RSFSR [1] as Autonomous Republics (ASSRs); thus they had not attained a nominally equal status with the RSFSR, under whose wing they remained. Khiva and Bukhara were now declared to be *Peoples* Soviet Republics, the word 'Socialist' being omitted for the reason given by Stalin himself that they were not socialist.

> But [he added] I do not doubt, comrades, and I hope you do not doubt also, that these republics, as they internally develop towards Socialism, will also form part of the confederate State which is now being constituted.

The grim irony behind the words is clear enough.

By 1924 the way had been prepared for a further rationalization of the constitution of the Central Asian provinces. In September of that year, Bukhara and Khiva took Stalin's hint and declared their adherence to Soviet Socialism, and steps were taken to redistribute the territories on what was described as the national principle. By May 1925 these two, together with most of the old Turkistan province, had become the two full constituent SSRs of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia (Tajikistan was at that time given the rank of an ASSR within Uzbekistan). Thus the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva ceased to exist. There was at least one Russian to regret it.

> Le Khorezm fut complètement éliminé comme état. . . . Jusqu'à quel point une telle mesure, qui s'inspirait du principe des nationalités, était-elle souhaitable? On peut en discuter . . . en ce qui concerne ses traditions historiques il restait un organisme visible et original, et l'anéantissement de cet organisme . . . n'aura peut-être pas été effectué sans conséquences.[2]

There remained a fringe of the old Turkistan province. By 1926 this had been united with the old Steppe Territory

[1] In what follows:
USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — the whole Russian Empire.
RSFSR = Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic — *i.e.* Russia proper, much the largest of the 16 constituent SSRs which make up the USSR.
SSR = Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* one of the other 15 of the 16 constituent Republics, *e.g.* Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
ASSR = Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic — *i.e.* a territory with limited 'autonomy' within an SSR, *e.g.* Karakalpak ASSR within Uzbekistan.

[2] Barthold, *op. cit.* p. 192.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

as Kazakistan, but still as an ASSR within the RSFSR. Similarly, Kirghizia in its mountains became a second ASSR within the RSFSR. Thus by 1926 the name of Turkistan had ceased to exist, and the shape of the new map had begun to emerge. There were already the five republics of today, but two of them only, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, had full constituent status. Of the other three, Kazakistan and Kirghizia remained ASSRs as part of the RSFSR, while Tajikistan had a similar standing as part of Uzbekistan. Of these three, Tajikistan alone rose to full constituent status as an SSR a few years later, in 1929.

Since then there has only been one significant constitutional development, and several adjustments of boundaries. The point of significance is that it took the eleven years until 1936 for Kazakistan and Kirghizia to qualify for full constituent status. The story of the disasters which accompanied this process belongs rather to the period of collectivization, to which we must turn later. Here it is enough to say that, apart from the fact that about one-third of the peasantry, in Kazakistan at least, was already Russian and therefore preferred to be included in the Russian State, the Soviets experienced the greatest difficulty in subjecting the nomads of the steppe and the mountains to any system which bore the stamp of Communist principle or practice. Dictatorial régimes have a traditional dislike of nomadism, which is hard to organize and eludes the tax-gatherer. Eleven years had to pass with devastating loss of human and animal life before the authorities could proceed to complete the pattern and bring Kazakistan and Kirghizia into line with the older republics as constituent SSRs.

FRONTIERS

A few minor boundary adjustments were made. What is now the Karakalpak ASSR with capital at Nukus was a slice of territory along the lower Amu Darya once part of Kazakistan and later transferred to Uzbekistan. It is possible that the setting up of this autonomous area was a belated Soviet

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

admission of the justice of Barthold's criticism of the annihilation of Khorezm. (Khorezm was really the settled area, while the Karakalpaks are in the main a steppe tribe, but the areas overlap.) And in 1929 there were adjustments between the Uzbek and the Tajik country, in particular the transfer of the lower part of the Farghana Valley — that part around Khojent (now Leninabad) inhabited mainly by Tajiks — from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan. The upper part of the valley, east of Andijan, is in Kirghizia, and a glance at the map reveals a strange interlacing of the inter-republican boundaries in this part of Central Asia.

Let us pursue this geography a little further, for on these administrative divisions the Kremlin relied to a large extent in support of its claim to be a respecter of nations. The official thesis was that the boundaries were drawn in accord with national principle, but not in such a way as to clash with economic divisions. It was stated, for instance, that each irrigation system was included as a rule in one republic.[1] There is Stalin's own verdict as guide.

> I think the recent delimitation of national frontiers in Turkistan may be regarded as an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. . . . In a pre-revolutionary era these countries were torn into fragments and were a convenient field for the exploitatory machinations of the powers that be. The time is now come when these scattered fragments can be reunited into independent states, so that the toiling masses can be welded with the organs of government.[2]

The map itself belies him, for the boundaries are confused and the territories twirled and twisted round each other like the spokes of a catherine wheel. It is not even true that the boundaries divide the language-stocks, the 1926 census showing considerable minorities of Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Kirghizia, of Kirghiz in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and of Tajiks in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia. Indeed, as history shows, Uzbeks and Tajiks in particular are inextricably mingled in all these parts of Turkistan. Turning to irrigation, we note that the

[1] Mikhailov, Bib. I, 72. [2] Bib. I, 90, p. 209.

[2] See cat. 116, map facing p. 272 -- Analyst

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia

177 by force if necessary, into settled stockmen under State control or wage-earners in factory or mine. That process was to come.

THE CONSTITUTION

642 The Party is not the only Soviet organ that has a central-
631 izing effect. There is also the Constitution and the effect of an official economy admittedly centralized. The Supreme Soviet and its Praesidium (which sits between sessions and, subject to Party manipulations, has the real power) legislates over the field of the entire Union and controls a 'federal' budget about five times the size of the local budgets of all the sixteen constituent republics put together. The Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet therefore levies taxes in the colonial empire just as in any other part of the Union. Theoretically, the interests of the colonial areas can be put forward in the Second House of the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet of Nationalities) which, like the American Senate, represents each constituent state equally. But the five Central Asian republics together have a relatively small representation in this House, and in any case it is unknown for an issue of policy to be raised or voted on. The system of one-party rule forbids that. Each republic, like the Union, has its own Supreme Soviet (but in this case of one House) and its Praesidium, but, as the finance figures show, it exercises authority in a narrow field, and its ministers are subordinate not only to the local Soviet but also to the corresponding federal minister in Moscow. Further, there is a practice whereby, when a minister is of Turkish or Tajik stock, his deputy is almost always Russian, and there have been many instances of penalties exacted from leaders of local origin who have sought to stress a traditional nationalism. Here again we see an economy and administration rooted from the Centre.

EDUCATION

000 It might seem that this central emphasis conflicts with a policy of cantonization. But one form of effective central

4:Leix U-S (no date)1941 RL1 Turkestan RL1



Ruins in Turkmenistan. This was a flourishing town in the 13th century, but is now in ruin, since its water supply was cut off during a war.

133 time the country was so barren that it was firmly believed to be inhabited only by ghosts.

101 131 By comparison with this desert area Western Turkestan is a rich country. It has at all times been of cultural importance, and sometimes of very great importance indeed. At the present day it is divided into the four republics of Uzbegistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kasakistan, which are incorporated into Soviet Russia. The territory stretches northward to the Aral Sea, in the West it is bordered by the Caspian Sea, in the South by Persia and Afghanistan, and to the East, as already stated, it abuts on Sinkiang, the westernmost province of China. Western Turkestan, too, is a land of

[634]

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		Families	Males	Females
361	Sarts Residents of Tash.	16,496	39,580	34,213
162	non-residents	22	987	68
	Tatars Residents of Tash.	170	320	253
	non-residents		37	
	Kazakhs Residents of Tash.	24	54	56
	non-residents		122	29
	Persians Residents of Tash.		1	
	non-residents			
	Afghans Residents of Tash.	5	10	9
	non-residents		6	
	Russians Residents of Tash.	5	14	6
	non-residents		18	
	Jews Residents of Tash.	53	124	78
	non-residents		11	
	Hindus		93	
	Chinese			3
	Totals	16,775	41,377	34,715

Grand Total: 16,775 families,
i.e. 76,092 persons.

361 [312] Russian or European Tashkent is directly next to the Asiatic town, divided from it by a broad aryk (canal), the Bos-Su.

In spite of its brief existence, the town is developing very quickly.

[31] /411/ All the okrug administration as well as the oblast' administration for the Syr-Darya oblast are in Tashkent.

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

THE 'NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION'

Soviet Central Asia went through many an experiment before taking its present shape. In the early years of Bolshevik rule Soviet Central Asia was still described as 'Turkestan', as it was under the Czarist Government. An Autonomous Turkestani S.S.R. was founded on May 1st, 1918. In addition there existed the 'Soviet People's Republics' (as distinct from 'Soviet Socialist Republics') of Bokhara and Khorezm, previously known as the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva. These two 'People's Republics' were formally outside the Soviet Union and were linked with the Russian Socialist Soviet Federation by treaties of alliance.

Turkestan, Bokhara and Khorezm had a multi-national character. The population of Turkestan consisted of 41·4 per cent Uzbeks, 10·8 per cent Kirghiz, 10·3 per cent Kazakhs, 7·7 per cent Tadzhiks, 4·7 per cent Turkmenians. Khorezm had 61 per cent Uzbeks and 28·8 per cent Turkmenians. 98·6 per cent of all Kirghiz and 66·5 per cent of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, but the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bokhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between three territorial units: 43·2 per cent lived in Turkestan, 27 per cent in Bokhara and 29·8 per cent in Khorezm.

The Soviet régime considered that its task in Central Asia consisted in establishing national states for Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmenians and Kirghiz. This was achieved by the formal annexation by Soviet Russia and partition of Bokhara and Khorezm and by the disbandment of the Turkestani A.S.S.R. This whole process was officially described as the 'national-territorial delimitation' of Soviet Central Asia. It was decided upon in principle in September 1924, and carried out by the spring of 1925. As an outcome of the 'delimitation' 94·2 per cent of all Turkmenians were allocated to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82·6 per cent of all Uzbeks of the U.S.S.R. to Uzbekistan, 86·7 per cent of all Kirghiz to Kirghizistan and 75·2 per cent of all Tadzhiks to Tadzhikistan.[1] (These percentages do not, however, take into account those Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, etc., who are living outside the Soviet Union.) Not all of the newly formed national territories were immediately given the rank of fully fledged Soviet Republics. Tadzhikistan, for instance, was an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan until 1929, when it was raised in status. Kirghizistan, originally an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the R.S.F.S.R., became a Soviet Republic as late as 1936. In the same year, Kazakhstan became the fifth Soviet Republic of Central Asia.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL-1

India to that list. Russian objectives in each of those countries are of a very different nature. The idea of annexing the whole or part of Afghanistan is from a Russian point of view not unreal. Nor can it be ruled out by a far-sighted Soviet policy. The idea of transforming Persia into an 'Iranian People's Republic' seemed to have been harboured and repeatedly encouraged by the Soviet rulers. In India, Russian aims were bound to be more modest. None the less, the Bolshevik leaders have always indulged in the hope that important sections of Indian public opinion can be influenced by clever propaganda on the achievements in Soviet Central Asia, and more particularly so if this propaganda were not conducted via Moscow but by reliable allegedly independent 'national governments' of Soviet Central Asia.

In regard to China, despite its long common frontier with Soviet Central Asia, the latter represents no more than a secondary base for a Russian political and propaganda offensive. The part assigned to Soviet Central Asia in a campaign against a hostile China was of a purely local character. It consisted of loosening the ties between the sparsely populated Chinese Turkestan and China proper.

Soviet Central Asia can fulfil its many-sided tasks within the framework of Russian power politics by its division into five Soviet Republics, each of which has a special part to play in Russia's relations with the outside world. The Soviet Government was fully aware of the fact that each of the five principal peoples of Soviet Central Asia had racial brothers living on the other side of the Russian border. There are Turkmenians both in Persia and Afghanistan; Tadzhiks both in Afghanistan and India; Uzbeks in Afghanistan; Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western China. It was, therefore, logical to assume that the very existence of national Turkmenian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz and Uzbek Republics would exercise a certain attraction on their kinsmen beyond the Soviet borders. It was even logical to believe that this attraction might ultimately lead to an enlargement of the 'national republics' of the U.S.S.R., and in the final analysis to an enlargement of the Russian Empire.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CENTRAL ASIATIC UNITY

By dividing Soviet Central Asia into five national republics the Government of the Soviet Union not only served the aims of its foreign policy but also safeguarded the stability of Russian rule in Soviet Central Asia itself. With the exception of the Tadzhiks and some minor ethnical groups, the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia are all Turkic peoples intimately inter-related. The formation of a Central Asiatic federation would, therefore, be quite logical and would probably correspond to the desires of the peoples concerned. Such a federation is, however, bound

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federative tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folklorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

* At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.[4]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Soviet Central Asia RL1

from the Caspian Sea (at Nebit-Dag), to the Fergana Valley and the lower Surkhan Darya, an affluent of the Amu Darya. Much importance is attached to the salt deposits in the Caspian gulf of Kara-Bogaz-Gol. This inlet, acting as a natural evaporating basin for the water of the Caspian Sea, has large deposits of Glauber salt (mirabilite). Sulphur deposits are found here to a greater extent than in any other part of the USSR, mainly in the center of the desert Kara-Kum, at Gaurdak, near the Amu Darya, and in the Fergana Valley. The ranges which surround this valley abound in nonferrous and rare metals: copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, tungsten, mercury, and antimony. In the highlands of the Pamir, Iceland spar (a variety of calcite), precious stones, and gold are being mined at the present time. The combination of coal and iron deposits in and near the Fergana Valley have permitted the development of heavy industry.

The population of Soviet Central Asia amounts to 10.4 million people, with an average density of 22 per square mile. While in the desert area the average density falls as low as a few people per 100 square miles, the fertile and well-irrigated oases have a population density of about 1,000–1,500 per square mile, the highest rural population concentration in the USSR. The basic elements of the population belong to the Turkic and Iranian groups. The former, by far the more numerous, includes Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Kara-Kalpaks, while the latter takes in the Tadzhiks, the remaining members of an ancient nationality of Central Asia, who speak a language akin to Iranian. The Uzbeks number more than one half the total population, besides Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, and Turkmen. Russians (above 6 percent), Bukhara Jews, Chinese Dungans, and others make up the remainder of this colorful ethnic mélange.

Until 1924 Soviet Central Asia was divided politically into the Turkestan Autonomous SSR (formed in 1922) and the Bukhara and the Khorezm Soviet People's republics (formed in 1920). Late in 1924 a reorganization of these territories and a redemarcation of boundaries along essentially ethnic lines led to the establishment of the Turkmen SSR, the Uzbek SSR (including the Tadzhik Autonomous SSR), and the Kara-Kirghiz (later Kirghiz) Autonomous SSR, which became part of the Russian SFSR. In 1929 and 1936, respectively, the Tadzhik and Kirghiz Autonomous SSR became full union republics.

Agricultural activities play the leading role in the economy of Central Asia. Depending upon the land form and the development of irrigation, the following branches of agriculture can be distinguished: (1) ir-